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THE COURT’S UNDUE BURDEN: A LOOK AT JESPERSEN AND 
ITS INCONSISTENCIES  
Alessandro Botta Blondet 
I. INTRODUCTION 
All over the country, some employers subject their employees to 
specific dress and grooming requirements. Some of these requirements 
may be for safety reasons, while others may be for portraying an image 
that employers want to convey. Sometimes, employers want to portray a 
professional image and will require professional attire to do so. Generally, 
grooming policies are unisex and require employees to wear socially 
accepted garments that are considered professional. This practice is 
understandably acceptable for some employers. For instance, a law firm 
would not want its attorneys to show up to a client meeting wearing gym 
clothes. Sometimes, however, appearance and grooming codes can be 
based on harmful stereotypes that have developed over time. 
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Jespersen v. 
Harrah,1 where Ms. Jespersen, the plaintiff, was fired because she refused 
to wear makeup, which was required by the employer’s grooming policy.2 
The court, relying on an “undue burdens” approach to grooming codes, 
ruled that the employer could require that its female employees wear 
makeup because the requirement did not place an unequal burden on 
women as compared to men.3 Part of that policy required men to keep 
their hair a certain length.4 Therefore, because the policy placed different, 
but essentially equal burdens on both sexes, the court held that the makeup 
requirement did not violate Title VII, despite being based on the 
stereotype that women need to wear makeup to look polished.  
Other circuits, however, have declined to follow the logic in 
Jespersen.5 At least one circuit court has relied on Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins,6 to hold that discrimination based on a sex stereotype is 
forbidden.7  
Given this predicament and the ruling in Jespersen, the undue burdens 
test it relies on raises doubts on its consistency with Title VII and on the 
 
 1. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 2. Id. at 1107-8 
 3. Id. at 1109-10. 
 4. Id. at 1108. 
 5. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 6. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 7. Id.  
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results it can yield. Therefore, this Article argues that the undue burdens 
approach is flawed and inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and 
with the overall purpose of Title VII. This Article also argues that 
employers already have an avenue towards legal discrimination under the 
bona fide occupational qualification defense. Further, this Article argues 
that even under the undue burdens approach used by the Ninth Circuit, 
the makeup requirement in defendant’s policy places an expense on 
women that is not placed on men and is therefore an unequal burden. 
Finally, this Article provides some possible solutions to this problem and 
makes predictions about the future of this particular area of employment 
law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section discusses Title VII and its intent followed by a brief 
discussion of disparate treatment claims. Then, it explains the relevant 
frameworks applied to employment discrimination cases, followed by an 
overview of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and the legislation that 
followed, which slightly altered its holding. Next, this section outlines the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., followed by the Sixth Circuit’s Smith v. City of Salem 
decision, both of which reached different conclusions. This section then 
explains the very narrow bona fide occupational qualification defense 
available to employers who discriminate. Finally, this section looks at 
some criticisms and proposed solutions to the unequal burdens approach 
used by the Ninth Circuit in Jespersen.  
A. Title VII. 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the intent to confer 
jurisdiction on federal district courts of the United States to provide 
injunctive relief against discrimination, to authorize the Attorney General 
to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and 
public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, and to 
establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity.8 As a means 
to effectuate these goals, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer: 
 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
 
 8. 88 P.L. 352, 78 Stat. 241. 
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origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.9 
 
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, the Supreme Court has 
pointed out that “we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they match a stereotype 
associated in their group . . . Congress intended to strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.”10  
B. Frameworks Under Title VII: Direct or Circumstantial Evidence and 
Single or Multiple Motivating Factors. 
Employment law can be complex because of the many frameworks that 
the courts have created over the years to analyze claims of discrimination. 
Most cases under Title VII are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
and not 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).11 Two ways employers can argue 
claims under these statutes are disparate treatment and disparate impact.12 
In a disparate treatment claim, an employee alleges that his or her 
employer treats some employees less favorably than others because of 
their race, color, religion or other protected characteristics.13 Proof of 
discriminatory motive is critical, although it can be inferred from 
differences in treatment.14 On the other hand, disparate impact involves 
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of 
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than 
another.15 For disparate impact claims, a plaintiff need not prove intent.16  
If a plaintiff has direct evidence that an employer discriminated against 
it, then that plaintiff’s case is examined in a straightforward way.17 Direct 
evidence is evidence that if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue 
without interferences or presumption and is composed of the most blatant 
 
 9. 42 USCS § 2000e-2(a). 
 10. Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 13 (1978). 
 11. United States EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 860 F.3d 564, 565 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 12. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004).  
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remarks whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate.18 
However, if a plaintiff only has circumstantial evidence, that case could 
be decided under the McDonnell Douglass framework (if it’s a single 
motive case) or under the Price Waterhouse framework and the 
amendments that followed (if employer had multiple motivating factors 
in its decision to adversely affect an employee). Circumstantial evidence 
is evidence that allows a jury to infer that a fact is true rather than directly 
supporting the truth of that fact.19  
In a single motive McDonnell Douglass framework, the plaintiff 
initially has the burden of production and persuasion on a preponderance 
of the evidence, and has to make out a prima facie case by showing that: 
(1) he/she was in a protected class; (2) he/she is qualified for the position 
at issue;20 (3) despite his/her qualifications, he/she was fired, and; (4) 
similarity situated employees outside the protected class receive better 
treatment that him/her.21 To be considered similarly situated, employees 
must be comparable in all material respects, such as having the same 
supervisor, engaging in similar conduct, and being subjected to the same 
standards.22 However, some courts use the “enough common features” 
analysis.23 Meeting these elements creates a rebuttable presumption of 
discrimination.24 
After the employee makes a prima facie showing, the burden of 
production shifts to the employer, who must articulate some legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.25 There is 
no credibility determination here; the bar is low, and the employer has to 
provide a non-discriminatory reason for the termination.26 
After an employer provides its evidence, the burden of production 
reverts back to the plaintiff, who must then show that the employer’s 
reasons for the adverse employment action are pretext for 
discrimination.27 An employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law if: (1) the record conclusively revealed some other, non-
 
 18. Sperino, Et al.., Employment Discrimination A Context and Practice Casebook at 56 (2nd ed. 
2014) (defining direct and circumstantial evidence and noting that direct evidence cases are rare). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. The qualifications must be the objective minimal qualifications unless a specific training is 
required for a position.  
 21. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (fn. 13 says these elements will 
differ from case to case depending on the facts and circumstances). 
 22. Brown v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Resources, 499 F.3d 675, 682 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 23. Elkhatib v Dunkin Donuts, Inc, 493 F3d 827, 831 (7th Cir 2007). 
 24. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-3.  
 25. Id. Adverse employment actions include failure to hire, termination, failure to promote, or 
demotion. Sperino, Et al., Employment Discrimination A Context and Practice Casebook 74 (2nd ed. 
2014). 
 26. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-3. 
 27. Id. at 804.  
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss2/5
2018] THE INCONSISTENCIES OF JESPERSEN 527 
discriminatory reason for the employer’s decision; or (2) the plaintiff 
created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was 
untrue and there was an abundance of evidence showing discrimination 
did not occur.28 
When an employer accounts for multiple motivating factors in its 
decision to fire or demote an employee, the proper framework comes from 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and the 1991 amendments to Title VII.29 In 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,30 the plaintiff, Ms. Hopkins, brought suit 
under Title VII alleging that the firm had discriminated against her by not 
making her a partner on the basis of her sex.31 Ms. Hopkins was regarded 
as an excellent employee and even helped defendant secure a $25 million 
contract with the Department of Defense.32 The lower court even pointed 
out that no other candidate for partnership with the firm had a similar 
work record.33 However, Ms. Hopkins was alleged to have bad 
interpersonal skills and was unduly harsh with her fellow employees and 
staff.34 Nonetheless, some of the partners reviewing Ms. Hopkins 
partnership candidacy reacted negatively towards her because she was a 
woman.35 Some of the comments made by these partners referred to her 
as being “macho,” that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” and 
that she needed to take “a course at charm school.”36 Ms. Hopkins was 
told that if she wanted to improve her partnership chances, she should 
walk, talk, and dress more femininely, wear more jewelry, and style her 
hair.37  
The District Court eventually found that Price Waterhouse had 
unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by 
consciously giving credence and effect to partners’ comments that 
resulted from sex stereotyping.38 The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision, but departed from the District Court’s reasoning, holding that 
the employer needed to prove their case by clear and convincing 
evidence.39 
A Supreme Court plurality disagreed and ruled that once a plaintiff has 
established that gender played a motivating part in an employment 
 
 28. See Id. at 792. 
 29. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 30. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 31. Id. at 232. 
 32. Id. at 233. 
 33. Id. at 234. 
 34. Id. at 234-5. 
 35. Id. at 235. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 237. 
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decision, a defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same 
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.40 
Further, it pointed out that “in the context of sex stereotyping, an 
employer who acts of the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be 
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”41 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse, the 
legislature passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which affirmed that the 
mixed-motives analysis was appropriate under Title VII but made some 
changes to the remedies available to plaintiffs.42 The Act now provides 
limited remedies if the employer proves an affirmative defense.43 Before 
the 1991 amendments, under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Price 
Waterhouse, a plaintiff would get nothing if the defendant proved an 
affirmative defense.44  
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Jespersen Decision. 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.45 was a case about appearance 
and grooming standards in the employment context. In this case, Ms. 
Jespersen worked as a bartender for defendant Harrah, a hotel casino, for 
over twenty years and had an exemplary record.46 It was not until the year 
2000 that defendant implemented a “personal best” grooming and 
appearance policy.47 The policy contained appearance standards that 
applied equally to both sexes and included a standard black uniform.48 
The policy also contained some sex-differentiated appearance 
requirements, such as hair, nails, and makeup.49 Bartenders and bar-backs 
working at Harrah had to adhere to additional guidelines.50 The following 
guidelines applied to both sexes: jewelry, if issued, must be worn, simple 
jewelry was permitted, no large chokers, chains, or bracelets.51 The 
guidelines also called for no faddish hairstyles or unnatural colors.52 For 
male employees, their hair must not extend below the top of the shirt 
 
 40. Id. at 258. 
 41. Id. at 250. 
 42. PL 102–166, November 21, 1991, 105 Stat 1071; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 43. Id.  
 44. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 45. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 46. Id. at 1107. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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collar, ponytails were prohibited, hands and fingernails must be clean and 
trimmed, no colored nail polish was permitted, and no eye and facial 
makeup was permitted, among other things.53 For female employees, hair 
had to be teased, curled, or styled everyday they worked, their nails had 
to be polished, makeup had to be worn and applied neatly in 
complementary colors, and lipstick had to be worn.54  
Ms. Jespersen did not wear makeup on or off the job and stated that 
wearing it conflicted with her self-image and ability to perform her job as 
a bartender.55 She even testified that the makeup requirement “affected 
her dignity and took away her credibility as an individual and as a 
person.”56 Unwilling to meet the makeup requirement, Ms. Jespersen left 
her employment with the defendant.57 She then filed suit alleging that the 
“personal best” policy discriminated against women by subjecting them 
to terms and conditions of employment to which men are not, and 
requiring that women conform to sex-based stereotypes as a term and 
condition of employment.58  
In response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgement, Ms. 
Jespersen relied solely on her testimony to establish that the “personal 
best” policy caused unequal burdens on women compared to men.59 The 
District Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgement 
and Ms. Jespersen appealed.60 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgement.61 Regarding 
Jespersen’s claim that the makeup policy discriminated against women 
and not men, the court stated that sex-based differences in appearance 
standards alone without a showing of disparate effect does not create a 
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.62 The court stated that 
appearance standards that impose different, but essentially equal, burdens 
on both sexes is not disparate treatment.63 However, if a policy applies 
less favorably to one gender and those burdens are obvious from the 
policy itself, then disparate treatment is evident.64 Finally, the court held 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1108. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. It is unclear whether she quit or if she was fired, on page 1107 the court says the “left her 
employment,” but on page 1114 the dissenting judge says, “Harrah fired her.” 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1109. 
 63. Id. at 1110. “[W]here . . . such [grooming and appearance] policies are reasonable and are 
imposed in an evenhanded manner om all employees, slight differences in the appearance requirements . 
. . have only a negligible effect on employment opportunities.  
 64. Id. at 1109.  
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that the settled law on grooming codes is not whether the policies between 
both sexes are different, but whether the policy imposed on the plaintiff 
creates an unequal burden for the plaintiff’s gender.65  
The court refused to take judicial notice of the fact that it takes more 
time and money for a woman to comply with the makeup requirement 
than it takes a man to comply with the short hair requirement,66 which 
ultimately cost Jespersen her case.67 
Regarding Jespersen’s sex stereotyping claim, the Ninth Circuit 
differentiated the facts from the case to those from Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.68 The court noted the facts in Jespersen were different in that 
defendant’s “personal best” policy did not single out Jespersen in the 
same manner that Ms. Hopkins was.69 In Jespersen, the overall policy 
requires all bartenders to wear the same uniform and it is, for the most 
part, unisex.70 Further, there was no evidence that the policy was enacted 
to make women bartenders conform to a commonly-accepted 
stereotypical image of what women should wear.71 Thus, the court 
concluded that summary judgment was properly granted.72 However, the 
court noted that it did not preclude sex-stereotyping claims on the basis 
of dress or appearance codes, just that no evidence of stereotypical 
motivation was found here.73 
The dissenting judges stated their belief that the policy was motivated 
by sex stereotyping and that Jespersen’s termination was due to her sex.74 
The dissent noted that a policy containing sex-differentiated requirements 
affecting people of both genders does not excuse a particular requirement 
from scrutiny.75 A refusal to consider the makeup requirement separately 
would allow “otherwise impermissible gender stereotypes to be 
neutralized by the presence of a stereotype or burden that affects people 
of the opposite gender.”76 Further, Judge Kozinski, dissenting, pointed 
out that the makeup policy was substantially more burdensome for 
women than for men in that purchasing and putting on makeup takes time 
and money, and that there was no similar male requirement.77  
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1110. 
 67. Id. at 1111. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 1112. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 1113.  
 73. Id. at 1114-8. 
 74. Id at 1114. 
 75. Id. at 1116. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 1117. 
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D. The Sixth Circuit’s Smith Decision. 
In Smith v. City of Salem,78 a transsexual plaintiff sued the City of 
Salem and various city officials for discrimination on the basis of sex.79 
The plaintiff worked for the City of Salem, Ohio, as a lieutenant in the 
Fire Department for seven years without any negative incidents.80 The 
plaintiff, who is biologically and by birth a male, is a transsexual and has 
been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (“GID”).81 After the 
plaintiff was diagnosed with GID, she began to express a more feminine 
appearance on a regular basis, including at work.82 The plaintiff’s co-
workers started to notice the change and began making comments.83 The 
plaintiff’s supervisors, named defendants in this action, eventually met 
and discussed options on how to terminate the plaintiff.84 At the meeting, 
defendants agreed to arrange for the Salem Civil Service Commission to 
require the plaintiff to undergo three separate psychological evaluations.85 
Defendants hoped that the plaintiff would either resign or refuse to 
comply.86 If she refused to comply, defendants reasoned, it could 
terminate the plaintiff’s employment for insubordination.87 
One of the plaintiff’s supervisors disagreed with the rest and labeled 
defendants’ plan a “witch hunt.”88 This supervisor warned the plaintiff 
about the meeting’s resolution, which prompted the plaintiff to seek 
counsel.89 The plaintiff’s counsel warned defendants about the legal 
repercussion of their decision.90 Defendants suspended the plaintiff for a 
24-hour period based on an alleged infraction of the city’s policy.91 At the 
hearing for the suspension, the commission upheld the suspension, which 
was eventually appealed.92 The plaintiff then brought suit asserting sex 
discrimination under Title VII, among other claims.93  
 
 78. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) 
 79. Id. at 567-8. 
 80. Id. at 568. 
 81. Id. The American Psychiatric Association characterizes as a disjunction between an 
individual's sexual organs and sexual identity. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 576-582 (4th ed. 2000). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 569. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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The Sixth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had established a Title VII 
prima facie case of discrimination.94 Following this determination, the 
court relied on Price Waterhouse to determine whether the plaintiff 
properly alleged a claim of sex stereotyping.95 The court noted that, under 
Price Waterhouse, discrimination because of “sex” includes gender 
discrimination96 and emphasized that “we are beyond the day when an 
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they 
matched the stereotype associated with their group.”97 With this in mind, 
the court found that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded claims of sex 
stereotyping and gender discrimination because of the allegations that her 
failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look 
and behave were the driving force behind defendants' actions.98  
The court noted that “[a]fter Price Waterhouse, an employer who 
discriminates against women because, for instance, they do not wear 
dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the 
discrimination would not occur but-for the victim's sex.”99 
Fourteen years after its Smith decision, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its 
views on sex stereotyping in EEOC v. R.G..100 In that case, the court stated 
that “even if we would permit certain sex-specific dress codes in a case 
where the issue was properly raised, we would not rely on either 
Jespersen or Barker to do so.”101 Further, the court noted that Smith and 
Jespersen are irreconcilable with one another because the Sixth Circuit’s 
ruling in Smith reaches the opposite conclusion: that requiring women to 
wear makeup does, in fact, constitute improper sex stereotyping.102 
Finally, the court stated that Jespersen’s incompatibility with Smith may 
explain why the Sixth Circuit has never endorsed it or cited to it, and why 
it should not be followed now.103  
F. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (“BFOQ”). 
A bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) is a defense to 
employment discrimination that is available to employers.104 This defense 
is very narrow, and it states that: 
 
 94. Id. at 571. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250. 
 97. Smith, 378 F.3d at 572, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. 
 98. Smith, 378 F.3d at 572. 
 99. Id. at 575. 
 100. No. 16-2424, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 5720 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2018). 
 101. Id. at 21. 
 102. Id. at 22. 
 103. Id. at 23. 
 104. 42 USC §20002-2(e). 
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[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify . 
. . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain 
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide 
occupation qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business or enterprise.105 
  
Initially, courts constructing a BFOQ standard required that an 
employer prove that “all or substantially all” protected members would 
be unable to fulfill the requisite job duties. For example, in Weeks v. 
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., an employer excluded women 
from positions requiring employees to lift more than thirty pounds.106 The 
court rejected this policy because the employer could not show that almost 
all women were unable to lift thirty pounds.107 The Fifth Circuit explained 
that “to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exception, an 
employer has the burden of proving that it had reasonable cause to 
believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all 
women would be unable to perform, safely and efficiently, the duties of 
the job involved.”108 
Two years after establishing the “all or substantially all” test, the Fifth 
Circuit, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., created another 
test, called the “essence of the business” test, to determine whether a 
BFOQ was properly established.109 In that case, employer Pan American 
maintained a policy of exclusively hiring females for its flight attendant 
positions.110 The court held that that “[d]iscrimination based on sex is 
valid only when the essence of the business operation would be 
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively.”111 The court 
ruled that females may be better suited to fulfill the required duties of the 
position, but that the essence of the business test was not fulfilled because 
transporting passengers safely from one place to another, the essence of 
the airline business, could be accomplished by males without seriously 
affecting the operation of an airline.112 
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court gave its express approval 
to both standards, but employers only need to successfully assert one of 
 
 105. Id.  
 106. 408 F.2d 228, 232-4 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 107. Id. at 235–36. 
 108. Id. at 235-6. 
 109. 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 110. Id. at 385. 
 111. Id. at 388. 
 112. Id. 
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them.113 After the Supreme Court authorized the use of both analyses, 
courts began to employ both tests concurrently as they focus on different 
considerations. The essence of the business test considers whether the 
employee’s desired trait is essential for the business to run successfully, 
while the all or substantially all test focuses on whether a class-based ban 
is the only feasible method of revealing those unable to perform the job. 
Often, courts require a third prerequisite, mandating that defendants 
also show that no reasonable, less discriminatory alternative exists, 
especially in cases where privacy is at issue.114 This third prerequisite is 
beyond the scope of this Article’s argument. 
The EEOC has also issued regulations pertaining to the use of the 
BFOQ defense.115 For instance, employers cannot claim BFOQ when 
they refuse to hire a woman because of assumptions of the comparative 
employment characteristics of women,116 stereotyped characterization of 
the sexes, or refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of co-
workers, the employer, or its clients.117  
G. Scholarship Criticisms of Jespersen. 
In 2006, an article titled Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth 
Circuit's Unequal Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated 
Grooming Standards under Title VII118 criticized the Jespersen decision. 
Author William Miller had two main arguments. First, he argued that the 
unequal burdens approach used in Jespersen allows harmful 
discrimination caused by sex-differentiated grooming standards to persist 
as long as the discriminatory burden is balanced against a corresponding 
burden on the other gender.119 Specifically, Miller noted that a strict 
adherence to the unequal burdens approach allows the most offensive sex 
discrimination to go unchecked so long as employees of the other gender 
are subjected to comparable time and cost burdens.120 For instance, a 
grooming standard requiring women to wear sexually revealing outfits, 
while requiring men to wear business casual attire constitutes harmful 
discrimination, however, under a strict application of the unequal burdens 
test, the policy would not violate Title VII because it does not impose a 
 
 113. 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977). 
 114. See Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 115. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a). 
 116. Id. For example, the assumption of a higher turnover rate among women. 
 117. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a). 
 118. William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth Circuit's Unequal Burdens 
Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards Under Title VII, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1357 
(2006). 
 119. Id. at 1360. 
 120. Id. at 1361-2. 
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greater time or cost burden on one gender relative to the other.121 
Second, Miller argued that the unequal burdens test is artificial because 
it fails to address the persistence of sex stereotypes, the real burden 
created by grooming standards.122 Miller suggests that by weighing only 
time and cost burdens, courts ignore the feelings of degradation that 
accompany grooming standards based on harmful prejudices and 
stereotypes.123 Under the unequal burdens test, harmful sex stereotypes 
go unchecked and continue to adversely impact employees because the 
test does not consider whether the grooming policy perpetuates harmful 
stereotypes.124 
As an alternative to the unequal burdens approach, Miller suggests that 
courts apply Price Waterhouse to grooming standard cases to determine 
whether those standards perpetuate outmoded, archaic sex stereotypes 
that serve to disadvantage or stigmatize one gender.125 After making this 
determination, he argues that courts should apply the unequal burdens 
test.126 
III. ARGUMENT 
This section is divided into five sub-sections. The first sub-section 
argues that the holding and reasoning in Jespersen is incompatible with 
the Supreme Court ruling in Price Waterhouse. The second sub-section 
argues that even if the “undue burdens” approach is compatible with Price 
Waterhouse, the “undue burdens” approach is flawed. The third sub-
section argues that the “undue burdens approach” is not needed because 
an exception to sex discrimination already exists through the BFOQ 
defense. The fourth subsection argues that even if the “undue burdens” 
approach is correct, the result in Jespersen is not because it costs more 
money for women than for men to adhere to Harrah’s policy. The fifth 
and final subsection offers some solutions for employers in their use of 
grooming codes and policies. 
A. The “Undue Burdens” Test Used in Jespersen is Incompatible with 
Supreme Court Precedent. 
In Jespersen, the Ninth Circuit held that grooming standards that 
impose different but equal burdens on both sexes does not violate Title 
 
 121. Id. at 1362. 
 122. Id. at 1360. 
 123. Id. at 1364. 
 124. Id. at 1365. 
 125. Id. at 1365-6. 
 126. Id. at 1366. 
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VII.127 Harrah’s policy prescribed the manner in which its employees 
were to carry themselves.128 Men had to have short, natural hair, and no 
makeup, among other things.129 On the other hand, women’s hair had to 
be styled, nail polished was to be worn, and makeup was a requirement.130 
Ms. Jespersen challenged the makeup requirement, stating that she never 
personally wore it and that she felt demeaned every time she did.131 
Harrah would not excuse plaintiff from the makeup requirement, which 
led to Ms. Jespersen’s termination.132  
In rejecting Ms. Jespersen’s sex discrimination claims, the Ninth 
Circuit differentiated this case from Price Waterhouse by pointing out 
that Harrah did not single out Ms. Jespersen in the same manner that the 
defendant in Price Waterhouse did with Ms. Hopkins because the policy 
in Jespersen was mostly unisex.133 Recall that in Price Waterhouse, the 
sex discrimination was not a policy but the comments and promotion 
criteria the partners took into account when making a decision.134 The 
Ninth Circuit also noted that it found no evidence that the policy was 
adopted to force women to conform to a stereotype.135 
These findings and conclusions, however, are flawed and incompatible 
with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Price Waterhouse. The Supreme 
Court in Price Waterhouse stated that discrimination because of “sex” 
includes gender discrimination and that “we are beyond the day when an 
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they 
matched the stereotype associated with their group.”136 The defendant in 
Jespersen violated this language directly by requiring women to conform 
to the stereotype that to look professional, women require makeup. It does 
not make a difference that the policies at issue in both cases differ, what 
matters is that they are discriminatory “because of sex.” The Ninth 
Circuit’s “undue burdens” test is irrelevant in determining that Harrah 
discriminated against Ms. Jespersen because of sex. By requiring her to 
conform to a stereotype, Harrah violated Title VII.  
The Sixth Circuit in Smith and later in R.G. was wise enough to 
recognize that the “undue burdens” approach is incorrect. In Smith, the 
court explicitly stated that requiring women to wear makeup is sex 
discrimination because it would not occur but for the employee’s sex. In 
 
 127. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 128. Id. at 1107. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 1108. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1111-2. 
 134. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 235 (1989). 
 135. Jespersen, 444 F. 3d at 1113.  
 136. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. 
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R.G., the Sixth Circuit confirmed this holding and stated that it would 
never cite to Jespersen and that other circuits should refrain from doing 
so.137 
Thus, the undue burdens test used in Jespersen is inconsistent with 
Price Waterhouse because it is based on a harmful sex stereotype, which 
the Supreme Court explicitly prohibited.  
B. The “Undue Burdens” Approach is Flawed. 
The Ninth Circuit in Jespersen relied on the “undue burdens” test to 
hold that Harrah had not discriminated against Ms. Jespersen because of 
her sex.138 The undue burdens test states that appearance standards that 
impose different but essentially equal burdens on both sexes does not 
violate Title VII.139 However, this approach is flawed because it allows 
for sex discrimination to occur as long both sexes are affected evenly. For 
instance, if an employer required men to be over 200lbs and women to be 
under 120lbs because men should be bigger than women and women 
should be smaller than men, under a pure application of the undue burdens 
test, this would not be discriminatory despite its clear discriminatory 
nature. Under the undue burdens test, both sexes in this scenario are 
evenly affected in a negative manner. Thus, even if the policy may seem 
discriminatory, the undue burdens test would find that this policy would 
not because both sexes are evenly affected. 
The purpose of Title VII is to rid the workplace of all types of 
discrimination.140 Under the undue burdens approach, discrimination 
would be allowed to continue as long as it is equal on both sexes. This 
result is inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII. However, as noted 
above, applying the Price Waterhouse approach would solve this 
problem. If an employer maintains the weight requirement policy stated 
above, neither of the weight restrictions would be allowed because they 
are based on sex-stereotypes and therefore discriminate against 
employees “because of sex.” 
Further, as Miller pointed out in his article, the unequal burdens 
approach fails to address the persistence of sex stereotypes by only 
weighting time and costs and ignoring the degrading and discriminatory 
prejudices that stereotypes have.141 By only focusing on whether a 
 
 137. EEOC v. R.G., No. 16-2424, 23, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 5720 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2018). 
 138. Jespersen, 444 F. 3d at 1110. 
 139. Id.  
 140. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 141. William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth Circuit's Unequal Burdens 
Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards Under Title VII, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1357, 
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grooming requirement is more expensive or time consuming on one sex 
against the other, courts that follow the undue burdens approach miss the 
whole point of Title VII, which is to get rid of workplace discrimination. 
The undue burden test is flawed because it allows workplace 
discrimination to occur so long as it is evenly distributed among the sexes.  
C. Employers with a “Real” Reason to Discriminate Already Have an 
Avenue to Do So. 
Title VII forbids employers from discriminating on the bases if age, 
race, sex, or place of origin.142 An exception to this statute is the bona fide 
occupational qualification defense (“BFOQ”). Under this narrow defense, 
an employer is allowed to discriminate against an employee on the basis 
on his religion, sex, or national origin.143 For example, the Supreme Court 
in Dothard stated that an employer could successfully plead a BFOQ 
defense if the essence or central mission of its business would be 
undermined by hiring members of both sexes and if there is no factual 
basis for believing that all or substantially all persons of one gender could 
not perform the job duties safely and efficiently.144  
Applying both relevant BFOQ tests to the facts in Jespersen leads to 
the conclusion that the BFOQ defense was not available to Harrah. Harrah 
ran a casino in Nevada and employed Ms. Jespersen as a bartender.145 For 
years, Ms. Jespersen was regarded as being excellent at her job.146 
Problems arose, however, when Harrah began to implement a grooming 
policy which, in part, required women to wear makeup and men to keep 
their hair short.147  
Under the “all or substantially all” test, Harrah would need to show that 
all or substantially all protected members would be unable to fulfill the 
requisite job duties without wearing the makeup. This variation of the test 
is appropriate as it attempts to excuse Harrah’s discriminating policy. 
Harrah is not saying that only men or only women can do this job. Harrah, 
through their overall policy, is saying that, as part of the polished look it 
wants its employees to display, women need to wear makeup.148 As noted 
above, Price Waterhouse held that employers cannot discriminate against 
employees based on a stereotype.149 The stereotype at issue here is that 
 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). Note that race is not included.  
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 145. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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women need to wear makeup to look polished or professional. Given that 
Ms. Jespersen satisfactorily performed her job as a bartender and that she 
was well liked by customers,150 it is impossible for Harrah to successfully 
assert that Ms. Jespersen, and all other female employees, need to wear 
makeup to fulfill the requisite job duties. Thus, the BFOQ defense under 
the all or substantially all test is not available to Harrah. 
Applying the “essence of the business” test with a slight variation to 
make the test fit Harrah’s makeup requirement yields the following: 
discrimination based on sex stereotype is valid only when the essence of 
the business operation would be undermined by adhering to that 
stereotype. Harrah would again be unable to make this showing. The 
essence of Harrah’s business is to run a casino.151 Bartenders are a key 
component of that business as guests frequently consume alcohol when 
they gamble. It does not follow, however, that Harrah’s makeup 
requirement is essential to the operation of a casino or bar. The main 
function of those business components is to serve customers. Ms. 
Jespersen had been a good bartender for Harrah for twenty years and had 
been regarded as an exemplary employee.152 Her employment was not an 
issue until Harrah implement the makeup requirement.153 Because Ms. 
Jespersen was regarded as an exemplary employee prior to the makeup 
requirement, it would be nearly impossible for Harrah to successfully 
argue that the makeup requirement is essential to its business. Therefore, 
the essence of the business defense would not be available to Harrah. 
Given the existence of the BFOQ defense to employee discrimination, 
it is unnecessary, and contrary to legislative intent, to have the court-
created undue burdens tests as well. By creating the BFOQ, the legislature 
gave an employer a route to “legal” discrimination.154 Had the legislature 
intended to create another avenue to “legal” discrimination, they would 
have explicitly done so. However, the legislature did not. The intent of 
Title VII was to rid discrimination from places of employment.155 The 
BFOQ defense was carved out for the businesses that cannot function 
without some type of necessary discrimination.156 The BFOQ is a very 
narrow defense, further highlighting the legislature’s concerns with 
allowing workplace discrimination. Why, then, would it be permissible to 
discriminate on the basis of sex if the discrimination does not create an 
undue burden on one sex? It is clear that men and women are anatomically 
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different. However, a functioning workplace does not need to adhere to 
this difference for it to run well. This is evidenced in Harrah’s own 
business, where Ms. Jespersen was an exemplary bartender without any 
major issues.157 Her job performance and her relationship with Harrah 
only deteriorated after the makeup policy was incorporated.158 If 
anything, there is a strong argument that Harrah’s makeup requirement 
hurt Harrah’s business as it lost a well-qualified and exemplary employee.  
In conclusion, the legislature enacted Title VII to remove 
discrimination from the workplace. In doing so, it realized that some 
businesses needed to be able to discriminate in order to operate properly 
and therefore created the BFOQ defense. It does not follow then, that the 
legislature intended businesses to discriminate against their employees by 
burdening both sexes. The undue burdens test is a judicially-created test 
and is widely used by some circuit courts. Its use is perfectly acceptable 
if the burdens placed on the sexes are not discriminatory nor based on a 
stereotype. However, when the burdens placed on each sex are based on 
stereotypes, as is the case in Jespersen, the undue burdens test runs afoul 
of Title VII and the BFOQ defense. Finally, the undue burdens test also 
creates an avenue towards discrimination not contemplated by the 
legislature. 
D. Jespersen was Incorrectly Decided Under the Undue Burdens 
Approach. 
Even if, in the future, the Supreme Court rules that the undue burdens 
approach is legal discrimination, the Ninth Circuit still wrongly decided 
Jespersen. In Jespersen, Ms. Jespersen decided to not bring forth 
evidence on how the makeup requirement placed an undue burden upon 
her.159 Ms. Jespersen also failed to provide evidence suggesting that 
Harrah’s motivations were to stereotype the women bartenders.160 In 
hindsight, this was a fatal mistake. Whether this was due to poor 
lawyering or Ms. Jespersen’s own faulty judgment is unclear. What is 
clear, however, is that had she provided some evidence on either of these 
issues, she might have had an easier time convincing the court that 
Harrah’s policy was discriminatory. Instead, Ms. Jespersen opted to rely 
solely on evidence that she had been a good bartender and that she had 
personal objections to complying with the policy.161 
Ms. Jespersen did ask the court to take judicial notice that it takes more 
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time and it costs more money for women to comply with the makeup 
requirement than it does for men to comply with the hair length 
requirements.162 Perhaps Ms. Jespersen assumed that the court would 
grant such request because the difference between the requirements is 
evident. It does not take an expert to conclude that it costs more time and 
money for the average female to purchase and put on makeup than it takes 
for an average male to get a haircut. For instance, fashion magazine 
People reports that the average woman spends about $15,000 on makeup 
in their lifetime.163 Though this figure highlights the costs for women who 
voluntarily wear makeup, it also shows that the “average” user spends a 
significant amount of money on makeup. Further, data from a mobile 
payment company called “Square” shows that the average haircut for men 
costs $28 nationwide, while the average haircut for women costs $44.164 
Even assuming that men cut their hair more often than women do, under 
Harrah’s policy, a woman has to bear the costs of both her more 
expensive, but less frequent hair-cut and the cost and time associated with 
purchasing and putting on makeup. Whereas men only need to comply 
with the less costly, more frequent hair-cut requirement.  
Regardless of the statistics or of the self-evident difference in the 
policy’s requirements, the Ninth Circuit noted that making this 
determination was not appropriate under the judicial notice doctrine.165 
The court stated that judicial notice is reserved for matters “generally 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court” or “capable of 
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.”166 The court stated that the time and 
cost of makeup and haircuts did not fit in either category and that judicial 
notice will not be used to cure Ms. Jespersen’s failure to provide the trial 
court with relevant evidence regarding the time and cost of makeup and 
haircuts.167 
The Ninth Circuit relied on its own judicial notice criteria of “matters 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court” or 
“capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”168 Under either, it is still self-
evident that it takes more time and more money for women to comply 
with Harrah’s policy than it does for men.  
 
 162. Id. at 1110. 
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Judge Kozinski, dissenting in Jespersen, pointed out that the policy is 
more burdensome for women than it is for men. His main concern was 
“by how much?”169 Judge Kozinski acknowledged that Ms. Jespersen 
failed to provide evidence and that it would have been a tidier case had 
she done so. He also stated that there is no doubt that putting on makeup 
requires more time and money.170 He commented, “[y]ou don't need an 
expert witness to figure out that [face powder, blush, mascara and lipstick] 
don’t grow on trees,”171 and concluded that the court could and should 
have taken judicial notice of these facts. 
In sum, even under the undue burdens approach, the Ninth Circuit 
wrongly decided Jespersen because Harrah’s policy clearly burdens 
women more than men. Women not only must keep their hair styled but 
they also have to purchase and wear makeup, while men only have to keep 
their hair short. Also, there is no equivalent male requirement. As Judge 
Kozinski noted, the court should have taken judicial notice of these facts. 
Had it done so, it would have found that Harrah’s policy burdened females 
more than males and therefore violating Title VII, even under the undue 
burdens approach.  
E. Proposed Solutions to Appearance and Grooming Codes. 
Given the different approaches the circuit courts apply to dress and 
grooming codes, employers can easily run afoul of Title VII if they base 
their dress and grooming policies on sex stereotypes. One common sense 
solution is to make dress and grooming policies 100% sex neutral. For 
instance, Harrah could have made a policy in which it describes what a 
polished employee looks like without referencing sex. Harrah could issue 
unisex standard uniform and require all employees to be “clean and 
polished.” It could say that hair is supposed to be kept “neat and combed” 
and that nails should be clean. It does not need to state sex specific 
requirements as it did in Jespersen. 
If Harrah really believed that the make-up requirement was essential to 
its business, then it can make wearing makeup a requirement for all 
bartender employees, male and female alike. Though it might seem odd 
to require men to wear makeup, men’s use of makeup is not uncommon 
as male news reporters and other TV personalities use makeup while still 
maintaining a polished and professional look. Requiring all bartenders to 
wear makeup does not violate Title VII under the undue burdens approach 
or the Price Waterhouse approach. Because the makeup requirement is a 
burden placed on both sexes, it would not place an undue burden on one 
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sex. Similarly, because the employer is not basing the makeup 
requirement on the stereotype that women ought to wear makeup, and by 
requiring every bartender to wear it, the employer would not be acting 
based on sex or a sex stereotype.  
Another solution would be to first apply the reasoning in Price 
Waterhouse and then use the undue burdens test. In his article, William 
Miller details this approach.172 He argued that by using the two-prong 
standard, courts will be able to differentiate grooming standards based on 
harmful sex stereotypes from benign sex-differentiated grooming 
standards.173 He provided the example of men being required to wear 
suits.174 It is a stereotype that professional men are to wear suits. 
Traditionally, this attire is worn by men to convey confidence and 
command respect. While clearly based on a sex specific stereotype, this 
requirement does not demean or stigmatize those abiding by it. On the 
other hand, an appearance standard requiring women to wear skirts may 
be based on the stereotype that women should have sex appeal.175 Unlike 
the suit requirement for men, the skirt requirement is based on a sex 
stereotype that is harmful and hardy benign.  
In the end, whether it’s through neutral policy or through a two-prong 
approach using both the Price Waterhouse language forbidding 
discrimination based on a stereotype and the undue burdens test, solutions 
do exist. Until either the legislature or the Supreme Court clarifies the 
appropriateness of the undue burdens, employers should be mindful of the 
potential legal consequences grooming and appearance policies can yield. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jespersen is flawed in multiple ways. 
First, it’s reliance on the undue burdens test is inconsistent with Price 
Waterhouse, a Supreme Court decision with expressly forbid sex 
discrimination based on harmful sex stereotypes. In Jespersen, defendant 
Harrah’s policy requiring women to wear makeup was based on the 
harmful stereotype that women need makeup to look polished and 
professional.  
Second, the undue burdens test itself is flawed because it allows for sex 
discrimination to occur as long both sexes are affected evenly. This result 
is in direct conflict with Title VII, which sought to eliminate 
discrimination from the workplace. Title VII created a very narrow 
exception, allowing employers to discriminate through the bona fide 
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occupational qualification defense (“BFOQ”). The defendant in 
Jespersen would not be able to successfully plead any variation of the 
BFOQ as their makeup requirement is not an essential function of their 
business. Ms. Jespersen worked for the defendant for over twenty years, 
prior the makeup requirement, in an exemplary manner and without 
issues. The makeup requirement did not enhance the business or Ms. 
Jespersen’s performance. In fact, the makeup requirement hurt Harrah’s 
business as it lost a very good employee. In Jespersen, the undue burdens 
test functioned as another avenue to discrimination, something Title VII 
does not condone given the narrowness of the BFOQ defense. 
Further, even assuming that the undue burdens test is consistent with 
Title VII and with Price Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Jespersen is still flawed because the makeup requirement does place an 
undue burden on female employees. The Ninth Circuit ruled that Ms. 
Jespersen was not entitled to judicial notice on the fact that it costs women 
more money and more time to comply with the makeup requirement than 
it does for men to comply with the short hair requirement. However, 
judicial notice should have been granted given how clear and obvious the 
discrepancies between the requirements are. A dissenting judge in 
Jespersen agreed with this proposition, stating that while the case would 
have been tidier with evidence, taking judicial notice on the cost and time 
discrepancies was well within the court’s ability. The makeup 
requirement clearly placed an undue burden on female employees and the 
court should have granted judicial notice despite Ms. Jespersen’s lack of 
evidence.  
Given the problems that the undue burdens approach can yield, 
employers would be wise to either enforce neutral grooming and 
appearance policies or to perform preliminary checks for harmful 
stereotypes before placing a burden on any sex. However, until the 
Supreme Court takes a case dealing with undue burdens test and its 
compatibility with Title VII, or the legislature clarifies its intent, 
employers in most circuits will be allowed to discriminate based on 
stereotypes as long the opposite sex has a different, but equal, burden 
placed on them. As society continues to seek workplace equality, the 
issues presented in cases like Jespersen will continue to gain relevance in 
the public’s eye. Perhaps a clear answer is on the horizon.  
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